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PROTECTING LINGUISTIC MINORITIES
UNDER TITLE VII: THE NEED FOR
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE EEOC
GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION
BECAUSE OF NATIONAL ORIGIN
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 3, 1997, Ricardo Guerra, an employee at a Milwaukee
fast food restaurant, was conversing with a fellow employee in Spanish
when the manager of the restaurant warned Guerra that she would ter-
minate him if he ever spoke Spanish on the job again.1 When the man-
ager subsequently asked Guerra to sign a notice of this reprimand,
Guerra refused, stating, "This offends me personally.... My parents
taught me Spanish and I learned English in school, so I speak both. I
am an American and raised here. It's not my fault I was raised with two
languages. I just want my respect." 2
Unfortunately, Guerra's story is not an isolated incident. As the
number of non-English speaking and bilingual individuals in the United
States increases,3 the trend to preserve the use of the English language
has grown. This movement has invaded many facets of American life,
but none so pervasively as the American workplace.4 In response to the
1. Georgia Pabst, "English-Only" Dispute, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, January
8, 1997, at B1.
2. Id. at B2.
3. According to the 1990 U.S. Census, more than 31.8 million people in the United
States speak languages other than English. This statistic represents a dramatic rise
since the 1980 Census, which revealed 23.1 million non-English speakers. In order
of frequency, Spanish, at 17.3 million, was the most common non-English language
spoken, followed by French at 1.7 million, German at 1.5 million, Italian at 1.3 mil-
lion, and Chinese at 1.2 million.
Gregory C. Parliman & Rosalie J. Shoeman, National Origin Discrimination or Employer
Prerogative? An Analysis of Language Rights in the Workplace, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 551
(1994).
4. For a general background of the English-only movement, see Antonio J. Califa, De-
claring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
293 (1989). For a general overview of English-only rules in the workplace, see Christine Ce-
sare & Lisa Lerner, "English-Only" Policies: A Guide for the Perplexed, 3 EMPLOYMENT L.
STRATEGIST 1 (1996).
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growing number of non-English speaking and bilingual individuals in
the workplace,5 many employers have implemented English-only work-
place rules, which prohibit or restrict the use of any language other than
English during working hours.
Employers have cited numerous reasons for implementing these
rules,7 and although some of these reasons are valid, many are nothing
more than a smokescreen for discrimination.8 For this reason, oppo-
nents of English-only rules have challenged the rules as discriminatory
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' which prohibits em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.' 0
Although Congress has never expressly defined the term "national
origin,"" the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),
which is responsible for enforcing Title VII, 2 has interpreted the con-
5. According to projections by the Department of Labor, white males will make up only
39% of the total workforce by the year 2000, which is a decrease from the 1991 figure of
46%. These projections estimate that Hispanics are the fastest growing ethnic minority
group in the United States, and the number of Hispanics in the workforce will increase from
7% to 10% by the year 2000. Also, the number of Asians will increase from 3% to 4%, and
the number of blacks will increase from 11% to 12%. Steven I. Locke, Language Discrimi-
nation and English-Only Rules in the Workplace: The Case for Legislative Amendment of Ti-
tle VII, 27 TEx. TECH L. REV. 33,44 (1996).
6. Id. at 35.
7. See Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Lan-
guage in the Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265 (1990) (explaining and criticizing the
most commonly cited employer justifications for English-only rules).
8. See, e.g., Mark L. Adams, Fear of Foreigners: Nativism and Workplace Language Re-
strictions, 74 OR. L. REV. 849 (1995) (arguing that English-only rules are a response to xeno-
phobia).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). Section 2000e-2(a), the provision that deals spe-
cifically with unlawful employer conduct states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
10. It
11. See Adams, supra note 8, at 877-78.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4. Initially, the EEOC was only authorized to receive and inves-
tigate discrimination charges, and it could only resolve those charges through mediation. Id.§ 2000e-4(g). In 1972, however, Congress amended Title VII to allow the EEOC to file civil
court actions. Id. § 2000e-5(f). Also, under § 2000e-4(g)(6), the EEOC, as a "quasi-judicial
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cept of national origin to encompass an individual's language rights. 3
Thus, the EEOC has attempted to protect the language rights of non-
English speaking and bilingual employees under Title VII." In doing
so, the EEOC has issued guidelines that allow employers to impose
English-only rules only if they can demonstrate a business necessity for
their implementation.'5 The EEOC's policy is entitled to "great defer-
ence" in the absence of "compelling indications" that its regulations are
"wrong."'6 However, the EEOC's policy does not constitute binding
authority. 17
That being the case, some courts have freely rejected the EEOC's
hard-line approach to English-only workplace rules.'8 These courts
have essentially held that (1) Title VII does not protect an individual's
primary language from national origin discrimination 9 and (2) English-
only rules do not have a discriminatory impact on bilingual employees
because these employees are able to comply with English-only rules.?
The conflict between the EEOC's policy and federal appellate court
decisions over the analysis of English-only rules has put both employers
and non-English speaking and bilingual employees in a precarious situa-
tion. Employers are faced with confusion in attempting to implement
legitimate English-only policies or in determining whether their existing
policies are valid under Title VII. At the same time, non-English
speaking and bilingual employees are left without an appropriate safe-
agency with enforcement power to implement the national policy of Title VII," Adams, su-
pra note 8, at 878, may "intervene in a civil action brought under section 2000e-5 by an ag-
grieved party against a respondent .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(6). Furthermore, Congress
gave the EEOC the authority to issue procedural guidelines. Id. § 2000e-12(a).
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1996) ("The primary language of an individual is often an
essential national origin characteristic.").
14. See generally id. § 1606.7.
15. Id. § 1606.7(b).
16. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86,94-95 (1973).
17. Id.
18. See generally Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993); Jurado v.
Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.
1980). Although the Fifth Circuit decided Garcia v. Gloor prior to the promulgation of the
EEOC Guidelines regarding English-only rules, other courts have relied on this case in re-
jecting the Guidelines. See infra notes 19-20.
19. See, e.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 ("Title VII, however, does not protect the
ability of workers to express their cultural heritage at the workplace.") (citing Gloor, 618
F.2d at 269).
20. See, e.g., Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1411 ("An employer can properly enforce a limited,
reasonable, and business-related English-only rule against an employee who can readily
comply with the rule and who voluntarily chooses not to observe it as 'a matter of individual
preference."') (citing Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270).
1998]
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guard against invalid policies.
This Comment suggests that the resolution of this conflict lies in ju-
dicial deference to the EEOC Guidelines. Part II compares and con-
trasts the interpretation of the national origin concept under Title VII
by the legislative and judicial branches and the EEOC, focusing on the
EEOC's application of this concept to the analysis of English-only rules.
Part III discusses the judicial analysis of workplace English-only rules
with respect to the EEOC Guidelines. Part IV suggests that the conflict
between the courts and the EEOC should be resolved by judicial defer-
ence to the EEOC Guidelines. Finally, Part V proposes that Congress
facilitate judicial deference to the EEOC Guidelines by amending Title
VII to prohibit employment practices that discriminate against indi-
viduals on the basis of language.
II. NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642' is a federal law that for-
bids employment discrimination on the basis of an "individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Title VII prohibits discrimina-
tory practices-both overt and covert--in hiring, firing, payment of
wages, and terms and conditions of employment,2 and it applies to all
employers and labor organizations that have fifteen or more employees
or members.2 These employers may lawfully discriminate in their em-
ployment practices only upon sufficiently demonstrating that an em-
ployment qualification or a legitimate business necessity justifies such
discrimination.26
The EEOC has traditionally analyzed employment discrimination
based on English-only rules within the context of national origin dis-
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e -2000e-17 (1994).
22. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
23. Originally, Title VII prohibited only overt discriminatory employment practices, but
Congress expanded Title VII to include covert discriminatory practices. See S. REP. No.
1137, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
25. 1d § 2000e(b)-(d).
26. Section 2000e-2(e)(1) provides that:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees.., on the basis of... religion, sex, or national origin in those certain in-
stances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or en-
terprise.
Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
[Vol. 81:569
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crimination under Title VIIC This view persists despite the fact that
Congress, in failing to define the term "national origin" in Title VII, has
not explicitly recognized an individual's primary language as an element
of national origin.2 Therefore, the debate continues over whether Title
VII protects an individual's right to speak his or her primary language
in the workplace.
A. Legislative and Judicial Interpretation of National Origin
The legislative history of Title VII provides only limited assistance
in determining the definition of national origin.29 Only a few represen-
tatives attempted to define the term national origin during the congres-
sional debates preceding the enactment of Title VII. 0 One such repre-
sentative was Representative Roosevelt (D. Cal.), who stated, "May I
just make very clear that 'national origin' means national. It means the
country which you or your forbearers came from .... "" Representative
Dent (D. Pa.) elaborated on this definition: "National origin, of course,
has nothing to do with color, religion, or the race of the individual. A
man may have migrated here from Great Britain and still be a colored
person. 3 2 Despite these valiant attempts at defining national origin,
Congress has never mentioned the specific characteristics that it would
recognize as elements of national origin. Therefore, the question of
whether Congress intended to include language as an element of na-
tional origin remains unanswered.
With little guidance from the legislature, the courts have broadly
construed the term national origin.33 In doing so, the courts have
equated the concept of national origin with characteristics that are
commonly associated with national origin, such as foreign accent' and
27. David T. Wiley, Whose Proof?: Deference to EEOC Guidelines on Disparate impact
Discrimination Analysis of "English-Only" Rules, 29 GA. L. REV. 539,545 (1995).
28. See Adams, supra note 8, at 877-78.
29. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973) (describing the legislative
history of Title VII as "quite meager").
30. See Adams, supra note 8, at 877-78.
31. See id. at 877.
32. See id at 878.
33. See Perea, supra note 7, at 274.
34. See, e.g., Fragrante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that discrimination based on foreign accent is unlawful unless the accent materially
interferes with an employee's performance); Bell v. Home Life Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 1549
(M.D.N.C. 1984) (holding that discrimination based on foreign accent may constitute na-
tional origin discrimination).
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height.35 Several courts have also recognized an individual's primary
language as such a characteristic."
B. The EEOC's Interpretation of National Origin
The EEOC has also broadly construed the concept of national ori-
gin.37 In 1970, the EEOC, in interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
promulgated and published the first Guidelines on Discrimination Be-
cause of National Origin (the "1970 Guidelines").38 The 1970 Guide-
lines broadly interpreted national origin discrimination to include em-
ployment discrimination based on an individual's place of origin or the
"physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a national origin
group."39 The EEOC also recognized that "[t]he primary language of an
individual is often an essential national origin characteristic," 4 and that
an English-only rule "may ... create an atmosphere of inferiority, isola-
tion, and intimidation., 41  Accordingly, a number of EEOC decisions
have held that employers that prohibit their employees from speaking a
language other than English in the workplace have violated Title VII by
discriminating on the basis of national origin.42  In response to the
EEOC's Guidelines and decisions recognizing language as a national
origin characteristic, several commentators have opined that an individ-
ual's primary language should be protected under Title VII as a charac-
teristic of national origin. 3
In 1980, the EEOC published a second set of Guidelines on Dis-
35. See, e.g., United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979)
(holding that a minimum height requirement for a truck driver position was possibly unlawful
because it disparately impacted Hispanic applicants and that the demonstration of a business
necessity was necessary); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that a minimum height requirement for firemen had a disparate impact on Mexican-
Americans).
36. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he
primary language of an individual is often an essential national origin characteristic .... )
(citing EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7a (1987)), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
37. See Wiley, supra note 27, at 547.
38. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1970).
39. Id. § 1606.1.
40. Id. § 1606.7(a).
41. Id.
42. See EEOC Dec. No. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820, 1823 (1981)
(striking down employer rule requiring employees to speak English at all times); EEOC Dec.
No. 71446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127, 1128 (1970) (holding that an employer rule
prohibiting employees from speaking Spanish constitutes national origin discrimination).
43. See generally Perea, supra note 7, at 275-87; Rey M. Rodriguez, The Misplaced Ap-
plication of English-Only Rules in the Workplace, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 67, 73-78
(1994).
[Vol. 81:569
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crimination Because of National Origin (the "1980 Guidelines"),' and
in 1987, the EEOC supplemented these Guidelines to specifically char-
acterize certain English-only rules as national origin discrimination.'
Unlike the 1970 Guidelines, the 1980 Guidelines directly addressed the
issue of English-only rules in relation to national origin discrimination."
In issuing and supplementing the 1980 Guidelines, the EEOC distin-
guished "blanket" English-only rules, which require English to be spo-
ken at all times, from more limited rules, which require that English be
spoken only at certain times and under certain circumstances of em-
ployment.47
Based on this distinction, the EEOC determined that the former
blanket rules were "a burdensome term and condition of employment"
that presumably violated Title VII"'" and that the latter, more limited
rules were permissible provided that an employer could demonstrate a
business necessity for implementing such rules.49 With regard to limited
English-only rules, the EEOC also stated that employers must provide
full and fair notice-including the consequences of violating the rule-
to their employees prior to implementation. 5 If the employer fails to
provide such notice, the EEOC will assume that a negative employment
decision based on the violation of the rule constitutes discrimination
based on national origin.51
44. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 45 Fed. Reg. 85632,
85634-35 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1996)).
45. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, Speak-English-only
Rules, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1996).
46. Id.
47. Compare § 1606.7(a) (English-only rules applied at all times) with § 1606.7(b)
(English-only rules applied only at certain times). See infra notes 48-49 (providing the text of
§ 1606.7(a) & (b), respectively).
48. Id. § 1606.7(a). This provision states:
A rule requiring employees to speak only English at all times in the workplace is a
burdensome term and condition of employment. The primary language of an indi-
vidual is often an essential national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at
all times, in the workplace, from speaking their primary language or the language
they speak most comfortably, disadvantages an individual's employment opportuni-
ties on the basis of national origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority,
isolation, and intimidation based on national origin which could result in a discrimi-
natory working environment. Therefore, the Commission will presume that such a
rule violates Title VII and will closely scrutinize it.
Id.
49. § 1606.7(b). This provision states: "An employer may have a rule requiring that
employees speak only English at certain times where the employer can show that the rule is
justified by business necessity." Id.
50. § 1606.7(c).
51. Id. § 1606.7(c) (1996).
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In order to assist employers in complying with the Guidelines, the
EEOC published a compliance manual in 1984.52 This manual analyzes
English-only rules under the two theories by which an employee may
show national origin discrimination under Title VII-the disparate
treatment theory53 and the disparate impact theory. '
C. Theories of Proving National Origin Discrimination
1. Disparate Treatment Theory
The disparate treatment standard, established by the United States
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' requires that an
employee alleging discrimination based on disparate treatment prove
that his or her employer intentionally discriminated against a class that
is protected by Title VII (i.e. a race, gender, religious, or national origin
class).,6 In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment,
the employee must prove that he or she experienced different-or dis-
parate-treatment with regard to "compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment"57 based on his or her race, sex, religion, or
national origin.58 When the employee has established a prima facie case
of disparate treatment, the employer must overcome the inference that
it acted in a discriminatory manner by proving that it had a nondis-
criminatory basis for the employment practice in question. 9
Employment discrimination through disparate treatment, however,
is uncommon-particularly with respect to English-only rules.0 As one
commentator has noted, an English-only rule could really only dis-
criminate through disparate treatment by "requiring members of one
national origin group to speak English while allowing members of an-
other national origin group to speak another language or languages; or
on paper requiring all employees to speak English, but in practice en-
forcing the rule against only certain national origin groups."" Since this
52. 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA), Speak-English-only Rules and Other Language Poli-
cies § 623 (1993) [hereinafter EEOC Compliance Manual].
53. Id. § 623.3.
54. Id § 623.6.
55. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
56. ma. at 802-06.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
58. EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 52, at § 623.3.
59. Id.
60. See Wiley, supra note 27, at 549.
61. Id. at 549.
[Vol. 81:569
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practice is uncommon, most employees who have complained about
English-only rules have alleged that they have suffered discrimination
under the disparate impact theory.62
2. Disparate Impact Theory
The disparate impact 3 standard, which the United States Supreme
Court established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' requires that the em-
ployee alleging discrimination based on disparate impact demonstrate
that a facially neutral employment practice results in disproportionate
discrimination against a protected class. 5 Under the Griggs disparate
impact analysis, once the plaintiff proves that a particular employment
practice has a significant adverse effect (disparate impact) on individu-
als protected under Title VII, the burden of proof shifts to the employer
to prove that the employment practice in question was justified by busi-
ness necessity.66 Even if the employer is able to establish business ne-
cessity, however, the plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating that a
nondiscriminatory alternative employment practice would equally serve
the employer's business necessity.67
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio," the United States Supreme
Court changed the burden of proof standards it had set out in Griggs.69
First, the Court held that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case
of disparate impact by (1) establishing that the employer's practice has
62. See id. at 549.
63. See generally Linda M. Mealey, Note, English-Only Rules and "Innocent" Employ-
ers: Clarifying National Origin Discrimination and Disparate Impact Theory Under Title VII,
74 MINN. L. REV. 387 (1989) (providing an in depth analysis of the disparate impact theory).
64. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). This case dealt with employee selection devices that had a dis-
parate impact on the basis of race. The employer in this case failed to prove that the high
school equivalency requirement was correlated with satisfactory job performance because
employees who had not finished high school had performed their jobs satisfactorily. Id at
431.
65. Idt
66. kd at 431-32. Courts have recognized that the Griggs disparate impact theory re-
quired plaintiffs to meet a very high burden of proof. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 136-40 (1976); Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380,383 (6th Cir. 1987).
67. Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417,1424 (9th Cir. 1990).
68. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). In this case, an Alaskan cannery separated jobs into "cannery"
and "noncannery" jobs. The noncannery jobs were filled predominately by whites and the
cannery jobs were filled predominately by nonwhites. A class of nonwhite cannery workers
sued under Title VII, claiming that the employer's practice of separating the jobs caused ra-
cial stratification and denied them noncannery jobs based on their race. Id. at 646-48. The
Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact. Id at 655.
69. Id. at 656-60.
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a disparate impact on a protected group,' (2) demonstrating that the
practice in question caused the disparity,7" and (3) demonstrating that
the practice has a "significantly disparate impact" on employment op-
portunities. 72 Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact, the employer only has the burden of production-not the
burden of persuasion-in justifying a particular employment practice. 3
Under this standard, the employer no longer has to establish an affirma-
tive defense of business necessity.74 Since the burden of persuasion rests
with the plaintiff at all times,7 the employer need only demonstrate that
the employment practice in question serves the employer's legitimate
employment goals.76
Through the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the Act),7 Congress codified
the Ward's Cove standard regarding the employee's establishment of a
prima facie case of disparate impact.78 At the same time, the Act rein-
stated the Griggs standard regarding the burden of proof on the em-
ployer. Thus, once the employee has established a prima facie case of
disparate impact, the burdens of both proof and persuasion rest on the
employer to establish sufficient business necessity.79  Under this stan-
dard, the employer must do more than merely assert a convenience or
70. Id at 656.
71. Id
72. Id at 657.
73. Id at 658-60.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 659.
77. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Congress
amended section 703 of Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (§§ 703(k)(1)(A)(i),(ii), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i),(ii) (1994)) to return the burden of proving business necessity
back to the employer and to allow the plaintiff to demonstrate disparate impact where the
employer fails to adopt an alternative nondiscriminatory employment practice. This
amendment added § 2000e-2(k) to Title VII, which provides in relevant part:
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this subchapter only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employ-
ment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business ne-
cessity;
(ii) or the complaining party makes the demonstration.., with respect to an alter-
native employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative
employment practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
78. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
79. See Wiley, supra note 27, at n.74.
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preference to establish a legitimate business necessity.'o Furthermore, if
the complaining employee can prove that a less discriminatory alterna-
tive to the employer's proffered business justification exists, the em-
ployee will still prevail.8' In summary, under the current standard, the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of proof in establishing disparate im-
pact, and then the burden of proof shifts to the employer to establish
business necessity."a
The EEOC Compliance Manual states that this disparate impact
analysis applies to challenges to English-only rules in situations where
(1) the employer has a policy requiring English to be spoken in
the workplace, (2) the rule is facially neutral (i.e. the rule is ap-
plicable to all employees regardless of race, color, national ori-
gin, sex, or religion), and (3) the rule allegedly affects one of the
classes protected under Title VII disproportionately.Y
The EEOC Compliance Manual also sets forth the parameters for
proving business necessity in a disparate impact challenge to an Eng-
lish-only rule: "An employer may prove business necessity if it can show
[that] a practice is necessary to safe and efficient job performance or to
safe and efficient operation of its business.""' The most commonly cited
employer justifications for implementinge English-only rules include:
reducing racial tension,' reducing disruptions, improving employees'
English proficiency,s' enhancing the effectiveness of employee supervi-
sion,' and promoting safety and efficiency in the workplace."
III. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF WORKPLACE ENGLISH-ONLY RULES:
THE LEADING CASES
In applying the disparate impact analysis to challenges against
80. See United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971)
(holding that "management convenience and business necessity are not synonymous").
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
83. Wiley, supra note 27, at 550-51.
84. Id. at 552.
85. See Perea, supra note 7, at 300-16 (criticizing the most common employer business
justifications for implementing English-only rules); see also infra note 277 and accompanying
text (discussing nondiscriminatory alternatives to English-only rules).
86. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1042 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
the reduction of racially-motivated fear and suspicion does not constitute a sufficient busi-
ness necessity), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
87. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 52, at § 623.6(d)(4).
88. Id. § 623.6(d)(1)(iii).
89. Id. § 623.6(d).
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workplace English-only rules, the courts have had a mixed reaction to
the EEOC Guidelines. Although the Guidelines have received some
deference,' federal appellate courts have been reluctant to adopt the
EEOC's hard-line approach to workplace English-only rules.9' Because
neither the Supreme Court nor the legislature has addressed the legality
of workplace English-only rules under Title VII, courts have exercised
broad discretion in deciding this issue.92
A. Saucedo v. Brother's Well Service, Inc.
In Saucedo v. Brother's Well Service, Inc." the first federal court de-
cision addressing a workplace English-only rule, the U.S. District Court
of the Southern District of Texas held that English-only rules have a
disparate impact on members of language minority groups.94 Brother's
Well Service was a family-owned business that operated "workover
rigs" (rigs placed over declining oil wells for the purpose of reclaiming
as much oil as possible).95 About 50% of the company's employees
were Mexican-American, including the plaintiff, John Saucedo.96 On
one occasion while Saucedo was employed at Brother's, a shop supervi-
sor told him that the company did not allow any "Mesican talk."' The
supervisor did not, however, inform Saucedo that the company had an
English-only policy or that violation of the rule was cause for termina-
tion.9 At a later date, the same supervisor terminated Saucedo because
he spoke two words of Spanish when he brought a part to a co-worker
and asked the co-worker where he should place the part.99 When the
90. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting the
EEOC Guidelines), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
91. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (expressly rejecting the
EEOC Guidelines), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2746 (1994); Gonzalez v. Salvation Army, 985
F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2342 (1993); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264
(5th Cir. 1980) (holding that an English-only rule did not violate Title VII prior to the prom-
ulgation of the 1980 EEOC Guidelines).
92. The United States Supreme Court has consistently avoided ruling on this issue. See
supra notes 90-91. The Court has recently granted certiorari in one English-only case, but
only to address the constitutionality of English-only laws under the First Amendment. See
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996), vacated as moot and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997).
93. 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 920.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 921.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 921-22.
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co-worker subsequently challenged Saucedo's termination, the supervi-
sor assaulted the co-worker."l
Because neither the shop supervisor nor the co-worker were repri-
manded for fighting and Saucedo's termination remained intact, the
court found that Saucedo's employer had discriminatorily discharged
him for violating an unwritten rule without knowledge of the conse-
quences of its violation.'0' Although the court did not decide the case
under the disparate impact analysis of discrimination, the court offered
influential dicta with regard to the disparate impact of English-only
rules in the workplace:
A rule that Spanish cannot be spoken on the job obviously has a
disparate impact upon Mexican-American employees. Most
Anglo-Americans obviously have no desire and no ability to
speak foreign languages on or off the job. The question in a case
of this nature therefore becomes whether or not the employer
can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his "rule" re-
quiring only English to be spoken on the job is [a] result of busi-
ness necessity.
B. Garcia v. Gloor
Acting contrary to the Saucedo court's holding, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Garcia v. Gloor, ° became the first federal appel-
late court to uphold an employer's English-only rule.' 4 The plaintiff
Hector Garcia was a native-born American of Mexican descent who
worked as a salesman at Gloor Lumber & Supply, Inc.' 5 Gloor, the
owner of the company, had implemented a rule that prohibited employ-
ees from speaking Spanish unless it was necessary for communication
with Spanish-speaking customers.'O' Gloor promulgated this rule be-
cause he believed that customers who did not speak Spanish would be
offended by communications they did not understand.' Gloor also felt
that the rule would improve his employees' English proficiency and that
this would allow for improved employee supervision.'O On these
100. m at 922.
101. Id. at 920-23.
102. Id. at 922.
103. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
104. Il
105. Id. at 266.
106. Id. The rule did not apply to employees who worked outside in the lumber yard,
and it did not apply during employee breaks. Id.
107. Id. at 267.
108. Id.
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grounds, Gloor enforced the rule by terminating Garcia when Garcia
addressed a fellow salesman in Spanish.'O°
Subsequent to his termination, Garcia claimed that the English-only
rule constituted national origin discrimination under Title VII. 0 The
Fifth Circuit, in rejecting Garcia's claim, held that national origin is not
equated with the language one chooses to speak and that Title VII does
not grant an employee the right to speak a particular language at
work."' According to the court, discrimination occurs when the com-
pany-imposed prohibitions are "beyond the victim's power to alter."
'
"
2
Thus, the court reasoned that if an employee is capable of speaking two
or more languages, the employee may change the language he or she
speaks to the one preferred by the employer. 13
Garcia also claimed that the English-only rule had a discriminatory
impact on a protected class of employees."4 In response to this claim,
the court stated:
The EEO Act does not support an interpretation that equates
the language an employee prefers to use with his national origin.
To a person who speaks only one tongue or to a person who has
difficulty using another language than the one spoken in his
home, language might well be an immutable characteristic like
skin color, sex, or place of birth. However, the language a per-
son who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a particular time is by
definition a matter of choice." 5
Thus, the court conceded to the possibility that an English-only rule
might constitute national origin discrimination if an employee could
only proficiently speak his or her native tongue."6 However, the court
109. Id. at 266.
110. I& at 267.
111. Idt at 268.
112. Ia at 269. The court applied the "mutable-immutable characteristics rationale,"
which it had established in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535 (5th
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc). Under this rationale, Title VII pro-
tects only those characteristics that an individual cannot change. Willingham, 507 F.2d at
1091. As one commentator has pointed out, however, the use of this rationale in a national
origin discrimination case was incorrect because the Willingham court intended the rationale
to apply only to "sex-plus" discrimination (discrimination based on the sex of the employee
plus some other apparently neutral hiring criteria, such as grooming). Aileen Maria Ugalde,
Comment, "No Se Habla Espanol". English-Only Rules in the Workplace, 44 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1209, 1236 (1990) (citing Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092).
113. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270.
114. Itt
115. Id.
116. Id
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refused to make the same concession for bilingual employees."'
C. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.
The next relevant case, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decided after the promulgation of the 1980 EEOC Guide-
lines, was Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp."' The plaintiff, Valentine Ju-
rado, was a bilingual disk-jockey who, at the direction of his program
director, began to use some "street" Spanish words and phrases on the
air in order to attract Hispanic listeners."9 When this strategy failed to
attract listeners, Jurado's program director ordered Jurado to stop
speaking Spanish on the air."2 When Jurado failed to comply with this
order, the radio station terminated him.' In response to his termina-
tion, Jurado sued the station, claiming that it had discriminated against
him based on his national origin and that the station's English-only rule
served as evidence of this discrimination.m
When the radio station moved for summary judgment, claiming that
it discharged Jurado for failure to comply with the order, the trial court
granted the motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.'1 Relying on Garcia
v. Gloor, the Ninth Circuit stated, "[a]n employer can properly enforce
a limited, reasonable, and business-related English-only rule against an
employee who can readily comply with the rule and who voluntarily
chooses not to observe it as 'a matter of individual preference."" 24
Thus, the Jurado court, like the Gloor court, held that if an employee is
capable of complying with an English-only rule, enforcement of the rule
against that employee does not constitute discrimination under Title
V. 1 25
D. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court
Soon after rendering its decision in Jurado, the Ninth Circuit drasti-
cally changed its position regarding workplace English-only rules in the
117. iL at 270-71. In light of later EEOC developments, the impact of the Gloor deci-
sion is questionable. Wiley, supra note 27, at 557.
118. 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
119. Id. at 1408.
120. Id.
121. Id-
122. Id. at 1409.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1411 (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,270 (5th Cir. 1980).
125. Id.
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case of Gutierrez v. Municipal Court.' This case involved an English-
only rule that the Municipal Court of the Southeast Judicial District,
County of Los Angeles, adopted after a black employee complained
about employees who were speaking Spanish.'2 This rule prohibited all
employees from speaking any language other than English except when
necessary to translate for the non-English speaking public." The rule
did not apply during the employees' breaks or lunchtime.'" The plain-
tiff, Alva Gutierrez, who worked as a deputy court clerk, filed suit in
federal district court, alleging that the English-only rule constituted na-
tional origin discrimination in violation of Title VII.I
The trial court granted a preliminary injunction against the Munici-
pal Court's application of the rule, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed this
decision based on the plaintiff's disparate impact claim.31 The Ninth
Circuit, in deferring to the EEOC Guidelines, stated,
We agree that English-only rules generally have an adverse im-
pact on protected groups and that they should be closely scruti-
nized.132 We also agree that such rules can "create an atmos-
phere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation."'33 Finally, we
agree that such rules can readily mask an intent to discriminate
on the basis of national origin.TM
The court also recognized that "language is an important aspect of
national origin"' 35 and that "[t]he cultural identity of certain minority
groups is tied to the use of their primary tongue.' '36 The court further
stated that an individual's "primary language remains an important link
to his ethnic culture and identity."'37 Thus, the court reasoned that
"[t]he mere fact that an employee is bilingual does not eliminate the
relationship between his primary language and the culture that is de-
126. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
127. Id. at 1036.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1037-38.
132- Id at 1040.
133. Id. (quoting the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin,
29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1996)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1039 (citing the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National
Origin, 29 C.F.R, § 1606.7(a)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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rived from his national origin.""' On these grounds, the court applied
the EEOC Guidelines in determining that the Municipal Court's Eng-
lish-only rule discriminated on the basis of national origin and was
therefore a violation of Title VII.
131
The court went on to distinguish Jurado from the present case.
140
The court reasoned that in Jurado, the radio station had a business ne-
cessity for implementing an English-only rule because the rule
"pertained only to on-the-air broadcasting-the product the employer
was offering to sell."''" Furthermore, the rule in Jurado applied to only
one employee.42 The court contrasted the situation in Jurado from this
case because, in this case, the rule applied to intra-employee conversa-
tions and did not have any impact on the operation of the court.43 Un-
like the employer in Jurado, the Municipal Court could not demon-
strate a business necessity for implementing an English-only rule.'" The
court found that the justifications offered in this case-precluding pos-
sible insubordinate remarks and reducing racial tension-did not satisfy
the business necessity standard.' 45 The court also found unpersuasive
the Municipal Court's argument that the English-only rule would en-
hance the supervision of court employees.'"
E. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.
In deciding Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,47 the next case addressing the
legality of a workplace English-only rule, the Ninth Circuit did yet an-
other turnabout in its position regarding English-only rules.'" Spun
Steak Company, a producer of meat and poultry products in the San
Francisco area, employed thirty-three workers, twenty-four of whom
were Spanish-speaking, but bilingual, two who spoke no English, and
138. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot,
490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
139. Id. at 1040-41.
140. Id. at 1041.
141. Id.
142 Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1041.
145. Id. at 1041-44.
146. Id. at 1043.
147. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
148. Id. The Garcia court concluded, inter alia, that Gutierrez had no precedential
value because the United States Supreme Court had vacated the case as moot. Id. at 1487
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others with varying degrees of English proficiency.149 In 1990, Spun
Steak instituted an English-only rule.' ° The company instituted the rule
after receiving complaints from non-Spanish speaking employees, who
claimed that certain Spanish-speaking employees were harassing them
in a language they could not understand and that this harassment made
it difficult for them to concentrate on their work.'
When the company enforced the rule against the plaintiffs Priscilla
Garcia and Marciela Buitrago, Garcia and Buitrago filed suit, alleging
that Spun Steak's English-only rule violated Title VII because it had a
disparate impact on the company's Hispanic employees.152 The plain-
tiffs argued that the rule had discriminatorily impacted them in three
ways. First, the rule denied them their right to express their cultural
heritage in the workplace.53 Second, the rule denied the plaintiffs a
privilege that monolingual English-speaking employees had. Third, the
rule, in violation of the EEOC guidelines, created "an atmosphere of
inferiority, isolation, and intimidation.""
The Ninth Circuit rejected all three of the plaintiffs' arguments.
First, the court found that the employees had no right to express their
cultural heritage in the workplace. The court stated:
Title VII, however, does not protect the ability of workers to ex-
press their cultural heritage at the workplace... It is axiomatic
that an employee must often sacrifice individual expression
during working hours. Just as a private employer is not required
to allow other types of self-expression, there is nothing in Title
VII which requires an employer to allow employees to express
their cultural identity. 55
Second, the court determined that Spun Steak's English-only rule
did not discriminate by denying a privilege to Spanish-speaking em-
ployees while granting the same privilege to native English-speaking
149. Id. at 1483.
150. Id. The rule stated:
It is hereafter the policy of this Company that only English will be spoken in con-
nection with work. During lunch, breaks, and employees' own time, they are obvi-
ously free to speak Spanish if they wish. However, we urge all of you not to use
your Spanish fluency in a fashion which may lead other employees to suffer humilia-
tion.
Id.
151. Id.
152. I& at 1483-84.
153. Id. at 1487.
154. Id. at 1488.
155. Id. at 1487.
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employees. 56 Relying on the ideology it had established in Jurado, the
court held that no disparate impact existed "if the rule is one that the
affected employee can readily observe and nonobservance is a matter of
individual preference."'" The court reasoned that, given the fact that all
but two of Spun Steak's Hispanic employees were bilingual, no dis-
crimination existed because the employees could comply with the
rule.
1 58
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that, contrary to the
EEOC Guidelines, Spun Steak's English-only rule created "an atmos-
phere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation based on national origin
which could result in a discriminatory working environment."'59 Al-
though the court acknowledged that the enforcement of English-only
rules might lead to a hostile work environment in some situations,"6° the
court dismissed the EEOC Guidelines. 6' Citing Gloor, the court stated
that because "nothing in the plain language of [Title VII] supports the
EEOC's English-only rule Guideline," there are "compelling indica-
tions" that the Guidelines are "wrong. ' 2 The court pointed out that
the Guidelines may be "wrong" because they presume that English-only
rules have a disparate impact before they require the plaintiff to make
an initial showing of disparate impact.'63 On these grounds, the court
reversed the lower court's granting of summary judgment, determining
that the plaintiffs failed to establish their prima facie case."
In his dissent, Judge Boochever, who agreed with most of the ma-
jority's opinion, stated that, given the EEOC's expertise with the issue
of employment discrimination and the lack of a "compelling indication"
that the EEOC Guidelines were wrong, the court should have upheld
the EEOC's regulations.65 According to Judge Boochever, the absence
of express legislative intent with regard to English-only rules was not
156. Id-
157. Id. (quoting Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,270 (5th Cir. 1980)).
158. Id. at 1487-88.
159. Ie at 1489 (29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1991)).
160. Id. The court stated, "We do not foreclose the prospect that in some circumstances
English-only rules can exacerbate existing tensions, or, when combined with other discrimi-
natory behavior, contribute to an overall environment of discrimination." Id-
161. Id. at 1489-90.
162 Id. at 1489.
163. Id. at 1490.
164. Id. at 1491. With respect to the one affected non-English speaking employee, the
court held that "summary judgment was improper because a genuine issue of material fact
exist[ed] as to whether she ha[d] been adversely affected by the policy." Id- at 1488.
165. Id. at 1490 (Boochever, J., dissenting in part).
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sufficient to conclude that the EEOC's regulations contravene congres-
sional intent.166 Furthermore, Judge Boochever found the majority's
analysis of English-only rules to be too subjective, stating, "It is hard to
envision how [the adverse effect] would be met other than by conclu-
sory self-serving statements.., or expert testimony.... ",'
F. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English
In the most recent case addressing English-only rules, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, contradicting itself once again, decided the constitutionality of an
Arizona state constitutional amendment which provided that English
was the official language of the state and that all government employees
must "act" in English.'68 The plaintiff, a former state employee, claimed
that this amendment violated her First Amendment rights.'69 The plain-
tiff, who handled medical malpractice claims against the state, was bi-
lingual and spoke Spanish to monolingual Spanish-speaking claimants
and a combination of English and Spanish to bilingual claimants"
The court, in holding that the state amendment violated free speech
rights, recognized that language is a "close and meaningful proxy for na-
tional origin."'' The court also rejected the appellants' argument that
First Amendment scrutiny should be relaxed because a bilingual plain-
tiff may choose whether to communicate in Spanish or English.'7 Con-
trary to its decision in Spun Steak, the court determined that the choice
to speak Spanish or English can represent "solidarity" and
"comfortableness,' 7' and it may be necessary so that the speaker can
166. Id. at 1490-91.
167. Id. at 1490. For a criticism of the Garcia v. Spun Steak Co. decision, see Stephanie
L. Kralik, Comment, Civil Rights-The Scope of Title VII Protection For Employees Chal-
lenging English-Only Rules-Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), 67
TEMP. L. REV. 393 (1994) (arguing that the Garcia court should have followed the modified
disparate impact analysis suggested by the EEOC) and Rodriguez, supra note 43 (arguing
that the Garcia decision was incorrect because the court failed to consider language as a
proxy for national origin and rejected the EEOC Guidelines).
168. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1995), cert
granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996), vacated as moot and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997). While
the holding in this case specifically addresses the First Amendment aspect of English-only
rules, the reasoning behind the court's decision regarding the relationship between language
and national origin is important for the purposes of this Comment.
169. Id. at 925.
170. Id. at 924.
171. Id. at 947.
172. Id. at 934.
173. Id. at 935.
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make himself understood.74 Because the court found that the adverse
impact of the amendment fell almost entirely on Hispanics and other
national origin minorities, the court struck the amendment down be-
cause it was facially overbroad and it constituted a violation of the First
Amendment.'7 5 The appellants appealed this decision to the United
States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.' On review, the Court
vacated the decision as moot because the plaintiff had resigned from
her position with the State of Arizona and remanded the case with di-
rections that it be dismissed by the district court."
IV. THE EEOC GUIDELINES ARE ENTITLED TO SUBSTANTIAL
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
A perusal of the case law reveals a substantial conflict in views be-
tween the separate branches of government and the judiciary-and
even within the judiciary 78-- regarding the general application of Eng-
lish-only rules. The most viable means of resolving this conflict is
through judicial deference to the EEOC Guidelines.
Although the courts do not consider the EEOC's regulations to con-
stitute binding authority, 79 the EEOC is entitled to "great deference" in
the absence of "compelling indication[s]" that its regulations are
"6wrong."'' Under this analysis, the EEOC Guidelines are entitled to
substantial deference by the courts because they are consistent with the
congressional intent behind Title VII and there are no "compelling in-
dications" that they are "wrong."
A. The Guidelines Are Consistent with the Congressional Intent Behind
Title VII
Congress enacted Title VII to "assure equality of employment op-
portunities by eliminating those practices and other devices that dis-
174. Id.
175. Id. at 931-34.
176. Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
177. Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997).
178. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has contradicted itself on the issue on numerous
occasions. Compare Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as
moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989) (adopting the EEOC Guidelines), with Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,
998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993). Also, with regard to the relationship between language and
national origin, the Spun Steak court held that language discrimination does not constitute
national origin discrimination. Id. at 1487-90. However, the same court later held that
"language is a close and meaningful proxy for national origin." Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 947.
179. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973).
180. Id.
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criminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.''.
As previously noted, Congress did not address the issue of English-only
rules in the context of Title VII and therefore the statute is silent as to
this issue." However, "[w]hen a statute is silent or ambiguous, courts
will generally defer to the interpretation by the agency responsible for
enforcing the Act when the interpretation is based on a permissible
construction of the statute."'"
In interpreting Title VII,' 4 the EEOC has identified the use of
workplace English-only rules as an employment practice that has a ten-
dency to discriminate against individuals on the basis of national ori-
gin.' This interpretation is based on the idea that, because an individ-
ual's primary language is such a fundamental aspect of his or her
national origin,'86 discrimination based on that language constitutes na-
tional origin discrimination.
Having identified the use of English-only rules as a practice that
may discriminate against individuals whose primary language is not
English, the EEOC, consistent with Title VII, has attempted to elimi-
nate the application of these rules as a means of discriminating against
non-English speaking and bilingual employees."" In doing so, the
EEOC has deemed "blanket" English-only rules (rules applied at all
times during the workday) to be presumptively discriminatory." The
EEOC has also attempted to restrict the use of the more limited rules to
situations where either the rule does not have a disparate impact on a
particular class of employees or the employer can demonstrate a legiti-
mate business necessity for implementing the rule.'89 Thus, the EEOC
Guidelines clearly further the Title VII objective of "eliminating those
practices that discriminate.., on the basis.., of national origin."'"
181. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457 (1975) (quoting Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,44 (1974)).
182. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
183. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
184. See infra Part IV(B)(1) (discussing in depth the EEOC's interpretation of national
origin under Title VII).
185. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)(1996) ("Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace,
from speaking their primary language or the language they speak most comfortably, disad-
vantages an individual's employment opportunities on the basis of national origin.").
186. Id. ("The primary language of an individual is often an essential national origin
characteristic.").
187. See id. § 1606.7.
188. See iL § 1606.7(a).
189. See id. § 1606.7(b).
190. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457 (1975) (quoting Alex-
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Because the EEOC Guidelines are consistent with the plain lan-
guage of Title VII, Congress has found the EEOC's interpretation of
Title VII to be permissible. In 1991, when Congress amended Title VII
to clarify the standard for proving disparate impact discrimination,
Congress specifically discussed the EEOC Guidelines regarding Eng-
lish-only rules and chose not to alter them."' Certainly, if Congress had
viewed the EEOC's Guidelines regarding English-only rules as an in-
correct interpretation of Title VII, it would have called for their altera-
tion. Since "an agency interpretation is entitled to greater deference
when Congress is aware of the interpretation and chooses not to change
it when amending the statute in other respects,"1 2 the EEOC Guide-
lines regarding workplace English-only laws are entitled to substantial
deference by the courts.
B. There Are No "Compelling Indications" That the Guidelines Are
"Wrong"
Despite the fact that the EEOC Guidelines are consistent with the
congressional intent behind Title VII, courts and commentators con-
tinue to reject the EEOC's hard-line approach to workplace English-
only rules. 93 The most commonly proffered justifications for rejecting
the EEOC's approach have been: (1) that the Guidelines incorrectly
recognize discrimination based on language as a form of national origin
discrimination,"94 (2) that the Guidelines needlessly protect bilingual in-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,44 (1974)).
191. When the Senate was discussing the possible amendment of Title VII, Senator
DeConcini said that a number of his constituents had complained about workplace English-
only rules. When Senator DeConcini asked Senator Kennedy, a supporter of the amend-
ment, whether the EEOC Guidelines would remain intact, Senator Kennedy answered that
the Guidelines had worked effectively and that the new legislation would not affect them in
any way. 137 CONG. REC. S15,489 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
192. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544,554 (1979).
193. See generally Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993); Jurado v.
Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.
1980) (rejecting the ideology upon which the subsequent Guidelines were based). See also
Debra Falduto Novack, English-Only Rules in the Workplace-The Need to Prove Disparate
Impact, 83 ILL. BJ. 474 (1995) (advocating the rejection of the EEOC Guidelines' presump-
tion favoring plaintiffs with respect to English-only policies); Patrick Wallace, Note, English-
Only Rules in the Workplace: Examining the Need to Balance the Burdens of Proof Under
Disparate Impact Analysis, 7 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 223 (1994) (arguing against judicial adoption
of the EEOC Guidelines); Wiley, supra note 27, at 543 ("[T]he EEOC's policy establishing
English-only rules as having a presumptive disparate impact is improper ....").
194. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487-90; Gloor, 618 F.2d 264. Although the Fifth Cir-
cuit decided Gloor prior to the promulgation of the EEOC Guidelines, the Gloor court re-
jected the concept that an individual's primary language is an element of his or her national
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dividuals who are capable of complying with English-only rules,195 and
(3) that the Guidelines defy congressional intent by altering the dispa-
rate impact analysis for employee challenges to English-only rules. 96 In
spite of these arguments, however, the EEOC's approach to workplace
English-only rules under the Guidelines is consistent with Title VII, and
courts should adhere to it.
1. The Guidelines Correctly Recognize Discrimination Based on
Language as a Form of National Origin Discrimination
The EEOC broadly defines national origin discrimination as in-
cluding "the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an in-
dividual's, or his or her ancestors', place of origin; or because an indi-
vidual has the physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a national
origin group."' 7 Under this definition, discrimination based on the lan-
guage a person speaks, which obviously falls within the category of
"linguistic characteristics," constitutes national origin discrimination.
While some courts have recognized discrimination based on an individ-
ual's foreign accent as a form of national origin discrimination,'98 many
have refused to do the same with respect to discrimination based on
language. The primary reason for this refusal is that courts have failed
to acknowledge the crucial bond that exists between an individual's
primary language and his or her national origin.
In Garcia v. Gloor,'9 the Fifth Circuit stated that "[n]either [Title
VII] nor common understanding equates national origin with the lan-
guage one chooses to speak." In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.20' and
Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,2 the Ninth Circuit relied on this determina-
tion when it rejected the Guidelines equation of language with national
origin: "Neither [Title VII] nor common understanding equates national origin with the lan-
guage that one chooses to speak." Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268.
195. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 (holding that an English-only rule does not have a
disparate impact "if the rule is one that the affected employee can readily observe and non-
observance is a matter of individual preference."); Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1411 (same) (citing
Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270).
196. See, e.g., Novack, supra note 193; Wallace, supra note 193; Wiley, supra note 27.
197. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1996) (emphasis added).
198. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
199. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980)
200. Id. at 268.
201. 813 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (viewing an individual's primary language as a
"matter of individual preference").
202. 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Title VII... does not protect the ability of
workers to express their cultural heritage [through language] at the workplace.").
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origin. Given the volume of evidence that clearly supports the Guide-
lines' position, however, the reasoning behind this rejection is clearly
erroneous.
Numerous scholars of ethnicity and language have opined that an
individual's language is a fundamental aspect of his or her national ori-
gin. One distinguished scholar, Joshua Fishman, has stated that ethnic-
ity encompasses "both the sense and the expression of 'collective, inter-
generational cultural continuity,' i.e. the sensing and expressing of link's
to 'one's own kind (one's own people).' It is through the expression of
ethnicity, one's cultural continuity and cultural traits, that 'national ori-
gin"' accrues significance.m With respect to the Hispanic culture in par-
ticular, scholars have noted that the Spanish language is imbedded in
the culture "in the sense that both their culture and language are de-
rived from the reality .in which they live; in turn, the culture and the
language shape that reality."'
Numerous legal commentators have also recognized the strong con-
nection between language and national origin.205 As one commentator
has stated, "Primary language... is closely correlated and inextricably
linked with national origin. '
American society in and of itself is evidence that the statements of
these scholars and legal commentators are true. The connection be-
tween language and national origin pervades every aspect of society, in-
cluding the media, popular culture, and education:
The continuing vitality of non-English language newspapers, as
well as radio and television broadcasts, reflects [the] strong bond
203. Perea, supra note 7, at 276 (quoting J. FISHMAN, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
ETHIC RIVAL: PERSPECTIVES ON LANGUAGE AND ETHNICITY 4 (date omitted from origi-
nal)).
204. Id. at 277. See, e.g., Stephen M. Cutler, Note, A Trait-Based Approach to National
Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE LJ. 1164, 1165 (1985) ("Differences in dress, lan-
guage, accent, and custom associated with a non-American origin are more likely to elicit
prejudicial attitudes than the fact of the origin itself.") (footnote omitted); James H. Do-
mengeaux, Comment, Native-Born Acadians and the Equality Ideal, 46 LA. L. REV. 1151,
1167 (1986) ("Language is the lifeblood of every ethnic group. To economically and psy-
chologically penalize a person for practicing his native tongue is to strike at the core of eth-
nicity."); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C. L. REV. 303,351-57 (1986).
205. One commentator's criticism of the current national origin concept states: "At first
glance, the current 'national origin' concept appears to be meant to include and protect eth-
nically different Americans. I believe, however, that true to its origins in the immigration
laws, today's 'national origin' concept operates to exclude ethnically different Ameri-
cans .... " Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 965,982 (1995).
206. Perea, supra note 7, at 276 (footnote omitted).
1998]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
between an individual's native language and cultural identity.
The important relationship between and ethnicity is also recog-
nized in the 6600 non-English language schools in the United
States, which are "unequivocally committed to the view that
their particular language and ethnicity linkage is vital and, hope-
fully, eternal." 2w
Given the many sociological and psychological factors that make
language a fundamental aspect of national origin,' one can accurately
conclude that an individual's primary language is a proxy for his or her
national origin. As such, discrimination based on an individual's pri-
mary language will inevitably pose a threat to that individual's right un-
der Title VII to be free from national origin discrimination. Thus, since
most, if not all, courts interpret Title VII as protecting an individual
from discrimination based on national origin, the courts must also in-
terpret Title VII as protecting one of the most fundamental aspects of
that individual's national origin-his or her primary language.
2. The Guidelines Properly Protect Bilingual Individuals from National
Origin Discrimination Based on Language
The EEOC Guidelines recognize that the inextricable bond between
language and national origin exists not only for monolingual non-
English speakers, but also for bilingual individuals.2w Because "[t]he
primary language provides bilingual individuals with associations and
notions of family, friendship, and intimacy, 2 10 the fact that these indi-
viduals speak English does not alter the status of their primary language
as an essential element of their national origin.
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have attempted to downplay the sig-
nificance of the connection between a bilingual individual's primary
language and national origin by inaccurately viewing a bilingual indi-
vidual's language as a matter of personal preference.21' Based on this
view, these courts have held that English-only rules do not have a dispa-
207. Adams, supra note 8, at 905.
208. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
209. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c). The Guidelines note that it is "common for individuals
whose primary language is not English to inadvertently change from speaking English to
speaking their primary language." Id.
210. Adams, supra note 8, at 906.
211. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhe language a
person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a particular time is... a matter of choice.")
(citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d
1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987) (same)).
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rate impact on bilingual individuals.2 12
In holding this view, the courts have incorrectly assumed that a bi-
lingual individual is fluent in both English and his or her primary lan-
guage,2' and they have disregarded the fact that individuals who are
considered bilingual have varying levels of English proficiency. As one
commentator has explained: "[w]hile bilingualism is often defined as
the ability 'to speak two languages with nearly equal facility,' bilingual-
ism should be considered 'as a spectrum of abilities in a second lan-
guage ranging from minimal ability to communicate in a second lan-
guage to equal facility in two languages.' 214 Thus, an English-only rule
would be substantially likely to hinder the ability of individuals with
minimal English proficiency to communicate in the workplace.
Bilingual individuals with a higher level of English proficiency
would also experience significant communication problems if an Eng-
lish-only rule prohibited them from speaking their primary language in
the workplace. This difficulty would arise from the fact that individuals
who have acquired a high level of English proficiency often engage in
"code-switching"-alternating between English and their primary lan-
guage as the circumstances warrant. 5 Since bilingual individuals usu-
ally engage in code-switching inadvertently, 26 they may often be subject
to reprimand and adverse employment decisions when attempting to
communicate in an "English-only" workplace. Under these circum-
stances, the bilingual individual's use of his or her primary language is
not a matter of personal preference. Regardless of the bilingual individ-
ual's level of English proficiency, the primary language plays a pivotal
role in his or her ability to communicate in the workplace.
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have denied the existence of this role
by incorrectly assuming that an English-only rule cannot have a dispa-
rate impact on a bilingual individual because a bilingual individual can
212. See supra note 211. In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., however, the Ninth Circuit con-
ceded that workplace English-only rules may have a disparate impact on non-English speak-
ing employees. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488.
213. Adams, supra note 8, at 906-907.
214. Id at 906.
215. See Alfredo Mirande, "En La Tierra Del Ciego, El Tuerto Es El Rey" ("In the
Land of the Blind, the One-Eyed Person is King"): Bilingualism as a Disability, 26 N.M. L.
REV. 75, 94-98 (1996) (discussing in depth the code-switching phenomenon). Mirande says,
"I propose that the dominant view is based on a conception of language use which treats bi-
lingual persons as two separate monolingual persons and fails to understand the nuance and
complexity of the bilingual experience." Id at 94. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) (1996).
216. Mirande, supra note 215, at 94-98.
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comply with the rule.217 Aside from the fact that not all bilingual em-
ployees can comply with an English-only rule to the employer's satisfac-
tion, ease of compliance on the part of the employee is irrelevant.218
An English-only rule can have a disparate impact on a particular
group regardless of whether the members of that group are able to
comply with it. In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., for example, the bilingual
plaintiffs argued that their employer's English-only rule denied them a
privilege that the employer gave to native English speakers-the ability
to speak in the language with which they felt most comfortable.19 In re-
sponse to this argument, the Ninth Circuit, in upholding the employer's
English-only rule, stated that, "A privilege.., is by definition given at
the employer's discretion...."m
The Ninth Circuit's response erroneously focused on the employees'
ability to comply with the rule rather than on the possibility that the
rule had a disparate impact on that group of employees. Hence, the
Ninth Circuit overlooked the possibility that an employment policy that
grants the "privilege" to one group of employees to converse in their
primary language and denies the same privilege to another group may
have a disparate impact on the group to whom the employer has denied
the privilege. Regardless of whether the adversely affected employees
are capable of complying with the policy, such inequality in the terms
and conditions of employment constitutes unlawful discrimination un-
der Title VII.
A bilingual individual's primary language is more than an expres-
sion of cultural heritage,2' it is a means of communication. Since most
bilingual individuals must rely on their primary language in order to ef-
fectively communicate, English-only rules may significantly hinder bi-
lingual individuals' ability to communicate in the workplace. Moreover,
if these individuals inadvertently speak their primary language during
working hours-which is a natural occurrence among bilingual indi-
217. See Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d at 1487 ("'There is no disparate impact' with respect
to a privilege of employment 'if the rule is one that the affected employee can readily ob-
serve and nonobservance is a matter of individual preference."') (citing Jurado v. Eleven-
Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that an English-only rule did not
have a disparate impact "because [the plaintiff] could easily comply with the order."); Gloor,
618 F.2d at 270 (same)).
218. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as
moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
219. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487.
220. Id
221. In Spun Steak, the Ninth Circuit held that "Title VII... does not protect the ability
of workers to express their cultural heritage at the workplace." Id
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viduals-they may be unfairly subjected to adverse employment deci-
sions. Under these circumstances, an English-only rule would have a
negative impact on bilingual employees, and, at the same time, have
almost no impact on native English-speaking employees (i.e., a dispa-
rate impact on the bilingual employees). In light of these circum-
stances, courts should defer to the EEOC Guidelines and recognize that
English-only rules may have a disparate impact on bilingual individuals.
3. The Disparate Impact Analysis Under the Guidelines is Consistent
with Title VII
Several commentators have argued that the disparate impact analy-
sis under the EEOC Guidelines contravenes Title VII by presuming
that workplace English-only rules have a disparate impact on monolin-
gual non-English speaking and bilingual employees without requiring
these employees to prove that these rules have disparately impacted
them.' Despite these arguments, the Guidelines, in distinguishing be-
tween English-only rules that are applicable at all times and English-
only rules that are applicable only at certain times,' have established
the presumption of disparate impact only with respect to the former
rules.' This presumption is consistent with Title VII. By presuming
that English-only rules, when applied at all times, have a disparate im-
pact on employees whose native language is not English, the Guidelines
further the Title VII objective of eliminating employment practices that
discriminate on the basis of national origin and are not supported by a
legitimate business justification.'
222. See Novack, supra note 193; Wallace, supra note 193; Wiley, supra note 27; see also
Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Guidelines
are "wrong" because they presume that English-only rules have a disparate impact without
requiring the plaintiff to prove disparate impact).
223. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1996) ("A rule requiring employees to speak only
English at all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition of employment....
Therefore, the Commission will presume that such a rule violates title VII .... "), with C.F.R.
§ 1606.7(b) ("An employer may have a rule requiring that employees speak only in English
at certain times where the employer can show that the rule is justified by business neces-
sity.").
224. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).
225. Section 2000e-2(e)(1) of Title VII states in part that:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and em-
ploy employees ... on the basis of... religion, sex, or national origin in those cer-
tain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness or enterprise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994).
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Title VII prohibits the promulgation of overly broad employment
policies that discriminate against individuals on the basis of national
origin, absent a demonstration of a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion.z2 A "blanket" English-only rule-a rule that is applicable at all
times-unquestionably fits into this category and should therefore con-
stitute a presumptive violation of Title VII for this as well as for other
reasons. First, English-only rules in general are very likely to have a
discriminatory, or disparate, impact on non-English speaking and bilin-
gual employees. Second, the employer can only overcome a showing of
disparate impact by proving that it has a legitimate business necessity
for implementing an English-only rule. An employer most likely will
not be able to demonstrate a legitimate business necessity to justify a
rule requiring English to be spoken at all times.
a. English-Only Rules Have a Strong Tendency to Discriminate Against
Employees Whose Primary Language is Not English
English-only rules-whether applied at all times or only at certain
times-have a very strong tendency to discriminate against employees
whose primary language is not English. An English-only rule may have
a number of adverse effects on non-English speaking and bilingual em-
ployees and, at the same time, have no effect on native English-
speaking employees. As one commentator has noted, "English-only
rules impose both economic and dignitary harms" on individuals whose
primary language is not English.' Native English-speaking employees,
on the other hand, are not likely to suffer from the same harms.
1. English-Only Rules May Impose Economic Harms on Employees
Whose Primary Language is Not English
The most obvious harm that English-only rules may impose on non-
English speaking and bilingual employees is that these employees are at
risk of losing their jobs if they violate English-only rules.m Since most
of these employees must, to some degree, use their primary language to
communicate in the workplace, this risk is significant. Conversely, na-
tive English-speaking employees are not likely to be at risk for violating
English-only rules.29 Thus, unlike non-English speaking and bilingual
226. Id.
227. See Jeffrey D. Kirtner, Note, English-Only Rules and the Role of Perspective in Ti-
tle VII Claims, 73 TEX. L. REV. 871, 894 (1995).
228. Id. at 894-95.
229. Id. at 894.
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employees, native English-speaking employees are not at risk of losing
their jobs for violating English-only rules.
English-only rules may also have an adverse effect on the job per-
formance of non-English speaking and bilingual employees m Effective
communication in the workplace is an essential-and often necessary-
element of acceptable job performance, especially at the training level.
As one commentator has noted, an individual's "inability to discuss
their training in their native language may make the difference between
acceptable progress and termination, or between being seen as espe-
cially quick, thus receiving a good initial position, and being seen as a
normally capable worker, thus receiving a position of lower responsi-
bility. ,
1)2
Effective communication also plays an integral role in the overall
productivity and efficiency of the workplace. Preventing employees
from speaking the language with which they are most comfortable may,
in some cases, result in decreased productivity and efficiency, allowing
employers an excuse to punish non-English speaking and bilingual em-
ployees with adverse employment decisions.
Imagine, for example, that X, a bilingual Hispanic-American indi-
vidual, is working on an assembly line when his machine breaks down.
Although he is bilingual, X does not know the English words to tell his
co-workers, other bilingual Hispanic-Americans, about the problem
with his machine. For fear of violating the company's English-only rule
and losing his job, X does nothing. X's fear of communicating in his
primary language to rectify the problem places the entire assembly line
in a state of disaster, and, as a result, X loses his job. In this situation,
the company's English-only rule has operated as a double-edged sword
against X by preventing him from doing his job effectively and then
firing him because he is unable to do so. Clearly, the rule could not
have such an effect on X's native English-speaking co-workers because
these employees are allowed to speak their primary language, and
therefore language is not an obstacle that they must overcome to per-
form their jobs effectively.
2. English-Only Rules May Impose Dignitary Harms on Employees
Whose Primary Language is Not English
English-only rules are not only capable of imposing economic harms
on employees whose native language is not English, but they may also
230. l at 895.
231. Id.
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impose dignitary harms on these individuals.32 Essentially, English-only
rules send non-English-speaking and bilingual employees the message
that they are somehow less "American" than their native English-
speaking counterparts2 3 As one commentator has observed, "The im-
plicit message to [employees whose primary language is not English] is
that if they 'act white,' they can stay, but if not, they can and will be re-
placed." 4 Through this message, English-only rules characterize for-
eign languages as taboo, as something that monolingual English-
speakers just don't want to hear.
Employers force non-English speaking and bilingual employees to
bear the burden of this intolerance by requiring them to abandon their
primary language-a fundamental aspect of their national origin 5 -at
the workplace door for eight or more hours every day. Under these cir-
cumstances, English-only rules inflict an injury "of stigmatization, or...
one of stamping non-English speakers with a 'badge of inferiority."' 6
Of course, English-only rules inflict no such injury on native English-
speaking employees because the primary language of these employ-
ees-English-is viewed as the "ideal," "American" language-the lan-
guage that all employees must speak in order to gain acceptance in the
workplace.
Given that workplace English-only rules have a strong tendency to
impose both economic and dignitary harms upon employees whose na-
tive language is not English, these rules very often discriminate on the
basis of national origin. Furthermore, the harms that these rules impose
fall almost exclusively on non-English speaking and bilingual employ-
ees, causing a disparate impact on this class of employees.
b. Employers Are Not Likely to Establish a Legitimate Business
Justification For Implementing a Blanket English-Only Rule
Despite the fact that a particular employment practice, such as an
English-only rule, may have a disparate impact on a protected class,
Congress has recognized that employers may have a legitimate business
232. Id. at 894 ("English-only rules impose both economic and dignitary harms.").
233. Wendy Olson, The Shame of Spanisk Cultural Bias in English First Legislation, 11
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 25 (1991) (describing the Hispanic perception that English-
only laws "assign their culture and language to an inferior role").
234. Kirtner, supra note 227, at 896.
235. See supra Part IV(B)(1) (discussing language as a fundamental aspect of national
origin).
236. Olson, supra note 233, at 24 (footnote omitted).
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necessity for implementing such a practice.23 Thus, under the standard
disparate impact analysis, once an employee proves that a particular
employment practice has a disparate impact on a protected class of em-
ployees, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate a legitimate
business necessity for implementing the practice in question."
With respect to limited English-only rules, the EEOC Guidelines,
recognizing the fact that employers may have a valid business reason for
implementing such rules, follow this standard analysis.29 The EEOC,
however, has refused to apply the standard disparate impact analysis to
blanket English-only rules because it views these rules as having a pre-
sumptive disparate impact on employees whose primary language is not
English.2'° Thus, the burden shifts automatically to the employer, and
the employee does not have to prove disparate impact.241
Despite arguments that this view contravenes Title VII,242 the
EEOC's approach to blanket English-only rules is consistent with the
Title VII objective of eliminating discriminatory employment practices
that have no legitimate business justification. 3 Apparently, the EEOC
assumes that employers will rarely be able to establish a business neces-
sity to justify the over breadth of blanket English-only rules. Indeed,
the EEOC's assumption is correct given the likelihood that an employer
does not have a legitimate business necessity for regulating the lan-
guage employees speak when they are at lunch, on a break, or in the re-
stroom. Such regulation extends beyond what is necessary for the
"normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ' 244 and en-
croaches upon the right of non-English speaking and bilingual employ-
237. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994).
238. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (discussing the current standard dis-
parate impact analysis).
239. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) (1996) ("An employer may have a rule requiring that
employees speak only in English at certain times where the employer can show that the rule
is justified by business necessity.").
240. See id. § 1606.7(a)("A rule requiring employees to speak only English at all times
in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition of employment... . Therefore, the
Commission will presume that such a rule violates [T]itle VII and will closely scrutinize it.").
241. Because English-only rules that are applicable at all times have a presumptive dis-
parate impact under the Guidelines, the disparate impact analysis under the Guidelines does
not require the employee to make an initial showing of disparate impact. See id.
242 See, e.g., Novack, supra note 193; Wallace, supra note 193; Wiley, supra note 27 (all
arguing that the Guidelines contravene the standard Title VII disparate impact analysis by
presuming disparate impact without requiring the complaining employee to make an initial
showing of disparate impact).
243. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994).
244. Id.
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ees to express themselves during their own personal time. Certainly, a
business will be no less productive because some of its employees speak
Spanish, French, Italian, Chinese, or Yiddish in the lunchroom. In the
absence of business necessity, an English-only rule that discriminates
against individuals based on their primary language-a proxy for their
national origin-is unquestionably a violation of Title VII. 245
Consistent with Title VII, the EEOC Guidelines attempt to discour-
age this practice. The Guidelines correctly recognize that if an English-
only rule more than likely has no business justification, the need to go
through the motions of a standard disparate impact analysis-placing
the initial burden on the employee and then shifting the burden to the
employer-is obviated.246 From a practical standpoint, the EEOC's ap-
proach makes sense. It relieves non-English speaking and bilingual
employees, who are clearly burdened by the over breadth of a blanket
English-only rule, from having to expend the time and energy proving
disparate impact when the employer will inevitably fail at the burden-
shifting stage.247
The EEOC's application of the disparate impact analysis to English-
only rules is consistent with Title VII. The Guidelines, recognizing the
fact that English-only rules have a strong tendency to discriminate
against employees whose primary language is not English, have at-
tempted to discourage employers from imposing blanket English-only
rules for which they are not likely to establish a legitimate business jus-
tification. This approach furthers the Title VII objective of eliminating
overly broad employment practices that discriminate on the basis of na-
tional origin and are not supported by a legitimate business justifica-
tion.2'
With respect to more limited English-only rules, the Guidelines are
also consistent with Title VII. The Guidelines recognize that an em-
ployer may have a legitimate business justification for requiring em-
ployees to speak English at certain times during working hours.249 Be-
cause a limited English-only rule does not have the element of over
breadth that a blanket rule has, the Guidelines apply the standard Title
VII disparate impact analysis to these types of rules-requiring the
plaintiff to prove disparate impact and then allowing the employer to
245. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
249. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b).
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demonstrate a legitimate business justification.20 Because the possibil-
ity of a business justification exists with a limited English-only rule,25'
unlike with a blanket rule, requiring the employee to make an initial
showing of disparate impact is fair and consistent with Title VII.
In sum, the EEOC Guidelines are generally consistent with Title
VII. Congress has found the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII with
respect to English-only rules to be a permissible construction of Title
VII,' and rightfully so. The Guidelines further the Title VII objective
of eliminating employment practices that discriminate on the basis of
national origin.2 In accomplishing this objective, the Guidelines regu-
late in a very fair and even-handed manner, balancing the interest of
non-English speaking and bilingual employees to communicate in the
workplace with the interest of employers in implementing employment
policies that will benefit the regular operation of their businesses. Al-
though courts and other commentators have criticized the Guidelines'
approach as incorrect, this Comment has demonstrated that this criti-
cism is unfounded and that the Guidelines are consistent with Title VII.
Since the Guidelines are consistent with Title VII and there are no
"compelling indications" that the they are "wrong," the Guidelines are
entitled to substantial judicial deference.2
V. FACILITATING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE EEOC GUIDELINES
THROUGH LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF TITLE VII
The EEOC Guidelines are clearly the most viable means of analyz-
ing English-only rules under Title VII. In refusing to defer to the
Guidelines, some courts have created confusing and inconsistent case
law, which leaves employers "in limbo as to whether their employment
policies [are] lawful." 5 The precedent arising from this case law is dan-
gerous because it fails to recognize that Title VII protects an individ-
ual's primary language-a fundamental aspect of his or her national
origin-from discrimination based on national origin. Furthermore,
this precedent disregards the fact that English-only rules may have a
disparate impact on bilingual employees who must often rely on their
250. See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 52, at § 623.6.
251. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) (1996).
25Z See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457 (1975)
(outlining the objectives of Title VII).
254. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973).
255. Locke, supra note 5, at 68.
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primary language to communicate in the workplace.f 6 The danger from
this case law emanates from the possibility that employers will formu-
late their English-only policies according to this inconsistent-and often
erroneous-precedent. Therefore, policies that are discriminatory will
fall through the cracks when courts uphold them for one of many un-
founded reasons, and non-English speaking and bilingual employees
across the country will suffer the consequences.
In light of the inconsistency of the case law addressing English-only
rules and the danger that is implicit in this inconsistency, Congress must
put "teeth" in the EEOC Guidelines by amending Title VII to prohibit
discrimination based on language.25 As one commentator has noted,
such an amendment would be analogous to one that Congress passed
almost twenty years ago to prohibit discrimination based on preg-
nancy2 8
In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA") when it was faced with the same conflict as it currently faces
with respect to language discrimination and English-only rules.259 The
EEOC had defined sex discrimination under Title VII as including dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy,m but the Supreme Court rejected
the EEOC's Guidelines and held that Title VII did not protect plaintiffs
from discrimination based on pregnancy.261 In response to this conflict,
Congress, sympathetic to the plight of women who had lost their jobs
due to pregnancy, amended Title VII through the PDA, which prohibits
employment discrimination based on pregnancy. 2
A. Congress Has Protected the Language Rights of Individuals Whose
Primary Language is Not English in Other Aspects of American Life
Congress must protect non-English speaking and bilingual individu-
als from language discrimination in the same way that it protected
women from pregnancy discrimination. Amending Title VII to prohibit
language discrimination in the workplace makes perfect sense in light of
the fact that Congress has protected the language rights of non-English
256. See supra Part IV (B)(2) for a detailed discussion of these issues.
257. See generally Locke, supra note 5 (advocating the amendment of Title VII to in-
clude language discrimination).
258. See Locke, supra note 5, at 67-69.
259. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
260. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a).
261. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that an employer's
disability plan that covered all disabilities except pregnancy was not a violation of Title VII).
262. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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speaking and bilingual individuals in other aspects of American life.
In 1975, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to include lin-
guistic minorities, requiring states to provide voting materials, instruc-
tions, and ballots "in the language of the applicable language minority
group as well as in the English language."' 3  Congress enacted this
amendment because "voting discrimination against citizens of language
minorities [was] pervasive and national in scope" and because "[s]uch
minority citizens are from environments in which the dominant lan-
guage is other than English.""
Subsequently, Congress enacted the Bilingual Education Act, which
funds bilingual education projects that help non-English speaking and
bilingual individuals with limited English proficiency.265 In enacting this
legislation, Congress noted that "there are large and growing numbers
of children of limited English proficiency[,] ... many of [whom] ...
have a cultural heritage which differs from that of English proficient
persons." '
Congress must follow its own trend and extend the protection of
language rights to language minorities in the workplace, where dis-
crimination against language minorities is just as "pervasive and na-
tional in scope ' 26' as it is in any other aspect of American society. By
amending Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on language, Con-
gress would take a significant step in eliminating discrimination of this
nature from yet another facet of American life.
B. Congress Must Enact a "Language Discrimination Act" to Amend
Title VII
Since language is such a fundamental aspect of national origin, 6
Congress must protect it by passing a Language Discrimination Act
("LDA") as an amendment to Title VII. This LDA would prohibit em-
ployment practices that discriminate against non-English speaking and
bilingual individuals 9 without a legitimate business necessity for doing
263. See Voting Rights Act of 1965-Extension, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4) (1982)).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1).
265. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3281-3341.
266. Id. § 3282(a)(1)-(2).
267. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4).
268. See supra Part IV(B)(1) (discussing language as a fundamental aspect of national
origin).
269. The LDA should expressly protect bilingual individuals because the primary lan-
guage is also a fundamental aspect of a bilingual individual's national origin. See supra Part
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so. 0 Because discrimination based on language is a form of national
origin discrimination, 27 the LDA would be consistent with Title VII.
C. The Amendment of Title VII Through the LDA Would Encourage
Courts to Adopt the EEOC's Cautious Approach to Workplace English-
Only Rules
Although Congress created the EEOC to enforce Title VII, the
EEOC's actual enforcement powers are rather weak in the eyes of the
judiciary. Courts have often ignored the EEOC's regulations in ren-
dering Title VII decisions because the EEOC regulations do not consti-
tute binding authority.' By enacting the LDA, which would constitute
binding authority, Congress would put an end to this unfortunate trend
in the area of language discrimination by encouraging courts to follow
the EEOC's cautious evaluation of employment policies that may dis-
criminate on the basis of language. The LDA would force courts to
recognize that English-only rules-which are the most likely employ-
ment practices to discriminate on the basis of language-may have a
discriminatory effect on non-English speaking and bilingual employees.
Thus, the courts would be more likely to adopt the EEOC's cautious
approach to English-only rules, and these rules would receive the high
level of judicial scrutiny they deserve.
D. Congress Should Grant the EEOC Authority to Enforce the LDA
Through Preventative Measures
The benefit of judicial deference to the EEOC Guidelines to non-
English speaking and bilingual employees goes without saying. How-
ever, judicial deference to the Guidelines would also benefit employers
by eliminating the confusion that they currently face regarding work-
place English-only rules. Most of this confusion has arisen from the
conflicting authorities that employers must presently consider when im-
plementing English-only rules or when determining the validity of their
existing rules under Title VII. Judicial deference to the Guidelines
through the LDA would create an acquiescence of authority, thereby
providing employers with a clear, consistent framework for imple-
IV(B)(1) (discussing how language is a fundamental aspect of a bilingual individual's na-
tional origin).
270. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
271. See supra Part IV(B)(1) (arguing that discrimination based on language is a form
of national origin discrimination).
272. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86,94-95 (1973).
[Vol. 81:569
PROTECTING LINGUISTIC MINORITIES
menting and evaluating their own workplace English-only rules.
Congress could make the LDA even more employer-friendly by al-
lowing the EEOC, in enforcing the LDA, to take preventative measures
to ensure employer compliance with Title VII. Such measures would
spare employers the cost of future litigation and other problems associ-
ated with invalid English-only policies, and, at the same time, they
would act as a safeguard to protect non-English speaking and bilingual
employees from possible discrimination.
1. Preventative Measures That the EEOC May Take to Ensure
Employer Compliance with the LDA
As part of the LDA, Congress should amend the EEOC's duties to
include reviewing specific employment policies that may discriminate
on the basis of language and determining whether these policies comply
with the Title VII. For example, if an employer were to consider im-
plementing a workplace English-only rule, that employer, under the
newly amended Title VII, would have the option of sending a draft of
the proposed rule to the nearest regional office of the EEOC for ap-
proval. "Along with this draft, the employer would include information
that would assist the EEOC in determining the validity of the proposed
rule, such as the percentage of non-English speaking and bilingual indi-
viduals that are employed at the employer's company, the estimated
range of English proficiency among these individuals, the specific occu-
pational duties of these individuals, and the employer's reasons for pro-
posing the rule. Employers who have already implemented English-
only rules would be able to determine the validity of their existing Eng-
lish-only rules in the same manner.
If the EEOC determines that a particular employer's English-only
rule is acceptable, the EEOC may subsequently conduct an on-site in-
vestigation of the workplace subsequent to the implementation of the
rule. This on-site investigation may include interviewing company em-
ployees who are affected by the English-only rule to determine whether
the company's rule has a discriminatory effect on non-English speaking
and bilingual employees.
2. The EEOC Should Encourage Nondiscriminatory Alternatives to
Workplace English-Only Rules
Whether the EEOC determines that an employer's English-only
rule is valid or invalid, it should encourage employers to utilize nondis-
criminatory alternatives to workplace English-only rules. As one com-
mentator has correctly noted, employers should institute English-only
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rules "[o]nly in workplaces in which language is critical to effective op-
eration of the business."273
By utilizing nondiscriminatory alternatives to English-only rules,
employers would be able to achieve most of the same goals that they
sought to achieve by implementing English-only rules. The following
chart lists some of the most commonly proffered business justifications
that employers have cited for implementing English-only rules along
with a nondiscriminatory alternative that the EEOC may encourage
employers to utilize in order to meet their particular business needs:74
Business Justification: Nondiscriminatory Alternative:
1. Reducing racial tension 1. Conduct special race rela-
in the workplace tions seminars
2. Difficulty in supervising 2. Employ bilingual supervisors
employees who speak
another language
3. Increase employees' 3. Sponsor English classes non-
English proficiency English speaking bilingual
employees
4. Workplace Safety 4. Distribute multilingual mate-
rial describing hazards and
procedures
If Congress granted the EEOC the authority to implement preven-
tative procedures such as those mentioned in this Comment, Title VII
would become more effective in eliminating employment practices that
discriminate on the basis of national origin. These procedures would
stop discriminatory practices before they start, benefiting employers
and non-English speaking and bilingual employees alike. Furthermore,
if Congress allowed the EEOC to take a more active role in the en-
forcement of Title VII, the courts would be more likely to appreciate
the EEOC's expertise in the area of employment discrimination, and
273. Rodriguez, supra note 43, at 80.
274. See id. (discussing nondiscriminatory alternatives to English-only rules). Employ-
ers should utilize these nondiscriminatory alternatives whenever possible. If an employee
were to prove that the employer's English-only policy had a disparate impact on non-English
speaking and bilingual employees, and the employer countered this with a business justifica-
tion, the employee would still prevail by demonstrating that a less discriminatory alternative
to the English-only rule exists. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (1994). Thus, the em-
ployer would prevent future problems by utilizing the less discriminatory alternative in the
first place.
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therefore the courts would lend more credence to the EEOC's regula-
tions.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the number of non-English speaking and bilingual individuals in
the United States increases, the face of the workforce will change ac-
cordingly, and more and more employees will be communicating in lan-
guages other than English in the workplace. In response to this trend,
employers are increasingly likely to implement workplace English-only
policies. Many of these policies will have a discriminatory effect on
employees whose primary language is not English.
Thus, in addressing the problems that are likely to arise from the in-
creased usage of English-only rules, courts must establish an appropri-
ate and consistent framework for analyzing these rules. The most viable
framework for analyzing English-only rules to date is that which the
EEOC has formulated in its Guidelines.
Courts should use the Guidelines as a framework primarily because
the Guidelines are consistent with Title VII. In accordance with the Ti-
tle VII mandate, the Guidelines prohibit employment practices that
unjustifiably discriminate against individuals on the basis of their pri-
mary language."'
Moreover, the Guidelines appropriately balance the interests of
both employers and non-English speaking and bilingual employees. On
one hand, the Guidelines protect non-English speaking and bilingual
employees from discrimination based on their primary language. On
the other hand, the Guidelines benefit employers by affording them the
opportunity to counter their employees' allegations of discrimination by
demonstrating a legitimate business necessity! 6  Furthermore, the
Guidelines' Compliance Manual provides employers with a clear, con-
sistent framework for implementing valid English-only policies and
evaluating the validity of existing policies under Title VII. "
Although the EEOC's Guidelines constitute a fair and effective
means of addressing the problems associated with language discrimina-
tion, many courts have refused to respect the EEOC's expertise in this
area. In furtherance of Title VII, Congress must facilitate judicial def-
erence to the EEOC Guidelines by passing a Language Discrimination
Act as an amendment to Title VII. By prohibiting employment dis-
275. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1996).
276. See ia- § 1606.7(b).
277. See generally EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 52.
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crimination based on language, Congress would encourage courts to
take the EEOC's cautious approach to workplace English-only rules.
A cautious approach to English-only rules on the part of the judici-
ary is an important and necessary step toward eliminating all forms of
discrimination from the workplace and from American society as a
whole. America has always prided itself on being a country that is built
on a foundation of racial, ethnic, and religious diversity. Such diversity
must not be forsaken in the workplace or in any other place that calls
itself American.
LISA L. BEHM"
* This Comment is dedicated to my family, especially Alex, Nancy, and Angela Behm,
whose love and support have made all things possible.
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